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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING MERLIN'S 
INTEREST IN THE BEAR LAKE CABIN WAS ENTIRELY MARITAL. 
The trial court abused its discretion in finding Merlin's 
premarital family cabin was entirely marital property. Because 
the portion of the trial court's decision with respect to the 
cabin is an abuse of discretion, this Court must reverse that 
portion of the decision. The trial Court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 13, 1999. R. 132-144. 
The trial court committed an abuse of discretion by finding 
that the Bear Lake Cabin was marital property. As noted in the 
Finding of Fact, the trial court found that the property was 
owned by Merlin prior to the parties marriage. R. 135-136. 
Further, the court specifically found that all premarital 
property should be awarded to the party who brought it into the 
marriage unless an exception to that rule applies as guided by 
Mortensen v. Mortensen. 
In Mortensen, the Court laid out exceptions to the rule the 
general rule that separate property, together with the 
appreciation thereof, should be awarded to the party who brought 
the property into the marriage. Specifically, the Court in 
Mortensen, stated that separate property may be considered 
marital property if "the other spouse has contributed to the 
augmentation, improvement, or operation of the property or has 
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significantly cared for, protected or preserved it." Id. at 306. 
Merlin believes that Louise conduct during the marriage does 
rise to the level of meeting the exceptions set forth in 
Mortensen as a matter of law and therefore the court abused its 
discretion. 
Louise testified that Merlin owned the cabin at the time of 
the parties marriage. TT. Vol. I, p. 43, L.12-13. Louise 
testified that an addition was made to the cabin after the 
parties marriage. TT. Vol. I, p. 43, L. 18-19. Louise testified 
that she did not know how the addition was paid for. TT. Vol. I, 
p. 47, L. 7-9. The Cabin was titled in the names of Merlin and 
LaVonne Symes, with LaVonne being Merlin's first wife. TT. Vol. 
I, p. 53, L. 3-5. Louise testified that during the marriage when 
the parties went to the cabin she cooked the meals, washed the 
dishes, cleaned, weeded and planted flowers. TT. Vol. I, p. 56, 
Line 5-11. On cross examination, Louise testified that she had 
not been to the cabin since 1996. TT. Vol. I, p. 163, L. 1-2. 
Louise admitted that title to the cabin and lot had never been in 
her name. TT. Vol. I, p. 198, L. 20-23. Louise did not know 
where the money came from to repurchase the adjoining lot at Bear 
Lake which had been previously sold. TT. Vol. I, p. 205, L. 9-
11. 
In contrast to Louise testimony about her alleged 
contributions to the Cabin and Lot, Merlin testified that the 
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addition to the cabin was paid for by his adult sons. TT. Vol. 
II, p. 362, L. 20-21. Merlin testified that most of the 
improvements to the cabin were performed by his sons using 
salvage materials and that he contributed not more than $5,000.00 
to that effort including the carpeting. TT. Vol. II, page 408, 
L.5-19. 
Merlin believes that the trial court abused its discretion 
in determining that any portion of the Bear Lake Property was 
marital under the exceptions found in Mortensen. It is a 
standard rule of construction that words are to be given their 
plain meaning. In the present case, Louise's own testimony is 
that she did nothing significant to augment the value of the 
property other than to lend some of her premarital property to 
furnish the cabin and to perform routine chores while at the 
property. Louise did not make any improvement to the property 
nor did she contribute to the operation of the property. Louise 
did not significantly care for the property. She did not protect 
the property nor did she preserve the property. Rather, when 
Louise and the family used the property, she did some chores 
which were related to the care of the family and persons who were 
there. This is not legally sufficient to meet the standard set 
forth in Mortensen. As such, the Court erred in determining that 
any portion of the Bear Lake Cabin and Lot were marital property. 
The Bear Lake Cabin was and remains separate property and should 
5 
be awarded to Merlin, free and clear of any interest in Louise. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
APPORTION TO MERLIN THE PREMARITAL VALUE OF THE CABIN AND 
THE APPRECIATION THEREOF. 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to 
apportion to Merlin his premarital interest in the cabin and 
award it to Merlin as separate property. Because the decision is 
an abuse of discretion, this Court should reverse the lower 
court's decision. 
Willard Peterson, a real estate appraiser specializing in 
appraisals of property surrounding Bear Lake, testified that he 
performed an appraisal valued the property on which the cabin 
sits with its improvements at $119,000.00. TT. Vol. I, p. 120, 
Line 1. Mr. Peterson stated that the remodeling and addition had 
added very little value to the cabin because it was not 
professionally done. TT. Vol. I, p. 120, L. 14-17. Mr. Peterson 
stated that the value of the addition was $29,000.00. Of that 
amount Merlins sums from a prior marriage contribute all but 
$5,000 TT. Vol. II, p.408, L. 5-19, Vol. II, p.362, L.20-21. TT. 
Vol. I, p. 124, L. 9-11. Mr. Peterson testified that the A-Frame 
Cabin without the addition had a value of $40,000.00. TT. Vol. 
I, p. 124, L. 6-8. Mr. Peterson testified that the Lot alone 
had a value of $50,000.00. TT. Vol. I, , p. 125, L. 19-21. As 
stated above, it was undisputed that the original A-Frame cabin 
and lot was pre-marital and that the only contribution to the 
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enhancement of the property was cleaning, hard work, and a $5,000 
contribution by Merlin to the work done by Merlin's sons. On 
those facts it is clearly error not to award the cabin to Merlin 
free and clear of any interest in Louise. 
It is the rule of law in this state that premarital 
property, together with the appreciation thereof, should normally 
be awarded to the party who brought that property into the 
marriage. See Mortensen; See Also Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133, 
135 (Utah 1987); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 
App. 1988); Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992); 
Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App. 1991); and Dunn v. 
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah App. 1990). Because of the 
relatively minor contributions from the marital estate (as 
compared to the separate contributions by Merlin's children to a 
cabin that was held separately as non-marital property), Merlin 
does not believe that the exceptions to the Rule applies 
previously argued. 
The Court did in fact provide Merlin with some credit for 
the premarital value of the property. However, this value did 
not reflect the appreciation of the premarital interest as shown 
by the only evidence presented to the Court at trial. 
Specifically, the Court awarded to Merlin a premarital interest 
in the property in the amount of $12,000.00. The balance of the 
value was considered marital property. To ignore the only 
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credible evidence and so rule was an abuse of discretion. 
See cases cited in previous paragraph. There was specific 
testimony from Willard Peterson who stated the aggregate value of 
the property was $119,000.00. Further, Mr. Peterson stated that 
the value of the improvements to the Cabin was $29,000.00. 
Therefore, all of the balance of the value of the Bear Lake Cabin 
was premarital property and the appreciation thereof, in the 
amount of $90,000.00. It was a clear abuse of discretion for the 
trial court to place a higher value of $29,000.00 to the 
improvements and ignore that most of those improvements were paid 
for by Merlin's children. 
It was additionally error to award Louise the marital 
residence in Layton. Specifically, the Court found that the 
Layton residence was valued at $141,000.00. The Court found a 
value for the Layton residence based on the appraisal, reduced 
that amount by Merlin's separate contribution (proceeds of a 
Workers Comp claim) and adding in the proceeds of the sale of a 
condo and arrived at the figure for the marital estate's interest 
of $120,674.00. Because the actual improvements to the Bear Lake 
Property was only $29,000.00,(all but $5,000 of which was paid 
for by Merlin's children), the Court should not have awarded to 
Louise, more than $14,500.00. Merlin's one half interest in the 
net value of the Layton residence was $60,337.00. Louise's 
interest in the Bear Lake Cabin should have been offset against 
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Merlin's interest in the Layton property. Instead the Court 
awarded her the entire Layton property valued at $120,674 and 
awarded Merlin the cabin (having a marital value that could not 
exceed $29,000). It was an abuse of discretion to do so. 
Alternatively, this Court should adopt a formula for 
addressing the division of real property in which there are 
separate property interests. This concept was set forth in Judge 
Michael D. Lyon's article in the Utah Bar Journal, entitled, The 
Source of Funds Rule-Equitably Classifying Separate and Marital 
Property, which sets a formulaic approach to the division of both 
marital and non-marital assets. Pursuant to the theory, called 
the "Source of Funds Rule" the initial step is to determine how 
and when the property was acquired. Using the present case as an 
example, there are two parcels of real property with an aggregate 
gross value of $260,000.00. Neither property has a mortgage. 
Under the source of funds rule, property may be separate, 
marital or mixed. For instance, in the present case, the 
property is both marital and mixed because of the lump sum 
contribution made to the Layton residence by Merlin and Merlin's 
premarital ownership of the Bear Lake Cabin and Lot. Under this 
rule, formulas determine value or net equity (separate 
contributions + marital contributions + appreciation); marital 
interest [present value(marital contributions/total 
contributions)]; separate interest [present value(separate 
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contributions/total contributions)]; separate contributions (FMV 
at time of marriage -mortgage at time of marriage); and marital 
contributions (mortgage at time of marriage -mortgage at time of 
divorce). This approach is consistent with principles of 
equitable distribution adopted by this Court and provides a 
uniform standard for trial judges to apply in the future. 
Applying the above stated formulas to the numbers in the 
present case would reach an equitable result which would 
recognize Merlin's separate property and the appreciation thereon 
as well as divide the parties marital contributions and the 
appreciation thereon equally. Merlin urges this Court to adopt 
the formulas set forth in the Source of Funds Rules as a method 
of standardizing the achievement of equitable distribution of 
separate and mixed property in this state and to remand to the 
trial court with instructions to do so. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
DIVIDE THE COSTS OF VALUING PROPERTY BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to charge 
the marital estate and divide the costs of the appraisals used by 
the Court in determining property values. It is axiomatic that 
the trial court has the discretion to award costs in divorce 
proceedings. Merlin recognizes that pursuant to the current Utah 
case law, appraisal and accounting fees which are incurred in 
preparation for a divorce trial cannot be taxed as costs. Morgan 
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v. Morgan,795 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990). However, Merlin 
believes that in instances such as the present case, where the 
Court finds an appraised value consistent with the only appraisal 
performed, each party should bear responsibility for half of the 
costs associated therewith. Making such a distribution promotes 
equity in equitable distribution rather than requiring one party 
to bear all of the costs of producing that evidence for the 
Court. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING POST 
TRIAL MOTIONS FOR TAKING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE. 
The court abused its discretion in denying post trial 
motions to take additional evidence on the monies received from 
the sale of the St. George condominium and the value of the cabin 
at the time of the marriage. Merlin filed a motion for 
reconsideration or alternatively to reopen the divorce proceeding 
to take additional evidence. There were significant discovery 
failures on the part of Appellee and Merlin's counsel was 
surprised at trial by Louise's counsels efforts to divide 
proceeds from the sale of a condo that had occurred three years 
prior to the parties separation. This Motion was denied by the 
trial court. Merlin believes it was an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court to deny his motion when said motion was timely 
filed and revealed to the Court that additional evidence which 
could not have reasonably been anticipated as needed would aid 
the Court in a proper determination of the issues before it. The 
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Court erred in not allowing that evidence to be introduced. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion by deciding that the 
entire cabin and lot at Bear Lake was marital property. Even 
assuming that it was marital property, it was an additional abuse 
of discretion for the trial court to fail to award to Merlin the 
reasonable premarital value of the cabin together with the 
appreciation thereon as testified by the appraiser which was the 
only evidence received at trial on that subject. This Court 
should adopt the source of funds rule as a formulaic method of 
dealing with real property values in the context of a divorce 
proceeding. Finally, the trial court abused its discretion by 
denying Merlin's post trial motion for reconsideration or 
alternatively to reopen the trial to take additional evidence on 
an issue that was not included in the pretrial order and could 
not have been reasonably anticipated by Merlin's attorney as a 
trial issue. This Court should reverse the decision of the trial 
court. 
Dated and Signed this day of December, 1999. 
Steven C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Appellant 
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